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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to § 782a-3(2)(d) Utah Code Ann. (1992 Supp.) whereby the Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction over all appeals from the Circuit Court.
"Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) gives the court of appeals jurisdiction
over 'appeals from the circuit courts,'"

State v. Humphrey, 823

P.2d 464, 467 (Utah 1991).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Under rules of statutory construction, can "throwing" be

fairly interpreted to include the conduct of spitting?

2.

Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 vague as applied to a

defendant prisoner who spits on a correctional officer?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Questions of statutory interpretation and vagueness are
questions of law.

Forbes v. St. Mark's Hospital, 754 P.2d 933,

934 (Utah 1988) . The court should apply a correctness standard,
"giving no deference [to the trial court's] conclusions of law."
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 818 (Utah
1991).

Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES

1.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Amendment XIV.

"No person shall . . . be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . "
2.

UTAH CONSTITUTION

Article I, § 7.

"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or

property, without due process of law."
3.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
a.

§ 76-5-102.6

Assault on a correctional officer.

Any

prisoner who throws fecal material or any other substance or
object at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The defendant was charged with Assault on a Correctional
Officer, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 on May 29, 1992. (R. at 1.)
On June 19, 1992 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which
was heard on July 9, 1992. (R. at 14.)

Judge Fuchs granted the

motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute did not apply.
(R. at 75.)

FACTS

The parties stipulated that John B. Byrge, a correctional
2

officer at the Salt Lake County Jail, if called as a witness
would testify that on May 23, 1992 Byrge was on duty, that
defendant was a prisoner confined in the Salt Lake County Jail,
and that defendant intentionally spit a mouthful of mucus at and
onto Byrge. (R. at 74-75.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Under general rules of statutory construction the statute
should be interpreted according to its usual and accepted
meaning.

In applying this principle, courts should not be

restrained by lock step literalness but let reason prevail.

The

legislature intended to protect correctional officers from
attempts by prisoners to douse officers with foul substances.

To

limit the application of § 76-5-102.6 by interpreting the word
"throw" as "to propel with the arm" is unjustified.

There are

other accepted meanings for the term which give effect to the
legislative intent.

Confining the definition to "propel with the

arm" though a usual and accepted meaning allows the statute to
delineate prohibited activity by criteria that is unrelated to
the harm the legislature sought to prevent.

Therefore, the court

should define the word "throw" to include "to propel through the
air in any manner" and also to define the act of spitting to be
included in the definition of "throw."
The statute is not vague for three reasons.

First, the

statute establishes a standard to prevent arbitrary application
3

by the corrections officers.

Second, the defendant should have

been reasonably aware this conduct was prohibited.

Third,

Propelling mucus through the air at a corrections officer is not
outside the objectives contemplated by the statute. Therefore,
the statute is not vague or ambiguous and does not deny the
defendant the protection of due process.

ARGUMENT

Under Fundamental Rules Of Statutory Construction § 76-5102.6 Prohibits A Prisoner From Spitting On A Corrections
Officer.
The general rules of statutory construction require that the
terms of a statute be interpreted "in accord with their usual and
accepted meanings."

Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d

1037, 1045 (Utah 1991).

Also, the statute should not be

construed in a piecemeal fashion but rather as a whole and in
light of its purpose or in other words the legislature's intent
in enacting the statute.

Id.; Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111,

115 (Utah 1991); Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah
1983).

The legislature has codified these rules for use in

interpreting criminal statutes.
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed
shall not apply to this code, any of its provisions, or any
offense defined by the laws of this state. All provisions
of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state
shall be construed according to the fair import of their
terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the
law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104.
4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1992).

In applying these rules, Utah

courts have read criminal statute according to their plain
meaning.

State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822, 826 (Utah App. 1991).

Reason and intention sometimes prevail over technically applied
literalness.

State v. Jones. 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987);

State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah App. 1989).

In

addition, courts sometimes refer to the dictionary to understand
the usual and accepted meanings of words.

See State v. One 1979

Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682, 683 (Utah App. 1989); See also
Serpente. 768 P.2d at 996.
In 1992, the legislature voted into law House Bill 176 which
enacted Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 (1992).

A common sense

reading of the statute indicates that its purpose is to protect
the health and safety of guards, jailers and other officers by
prohibiting attempts by prisoners to douse officers with foul
substances.

Also, the statute applies to "any prisoner."

It

applies to "fecal material or any other substance or object."

It

applies to and protects any "peace or correctional officer."
Such language seems to be meant to cover a variety of
circumstances.

Indeed, during the floor debate on H.B. 176 the

Billfs sponsor stated it covered those circumstances when
prisoners mistreated their guards.

See Floor Debate, Utah House

of Representatives, February 17, 1992 (Rep. Tuttle: "What this
does is . . . give the . . . prisons . . . a tool that they can
use . . . on criminals that . . . are not kind to their innkeeper
. . .").

Judge Fuchs even recognized this as the purpose of the
5

statute.

See Transcripts of Motion Hearing, p.10.

Even though he recognized the purpose of the statute, Judge
Fuchs held that the word "throw" as used in the statute meant
only "to propel with your arm."
10.

Transcript of Motion Hearing, p.

Such a narrow definition of the word "throw" is not

justified for several reasons; first, there are several other
usual and accepted meanings of the word "throw," second, some of
these meanings are more consistent with and give effect to the
legislative intent, and third, the legislature has used the word
"throw" in other statutes, without specific statutory definition,
to mean propel by any means rather than just by motion of the
arm.
It is true that a common definition of the word "throw" is
"to propel through the air by a forward motion of the hand and
arm."

Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 2385 (1981).

But even this does not fit Judge Fuchs1 definition of "throw"
since he apparently would allow as a "throw" any movement of the
arm which propels an object.

However, in the second subsection

of that first definition, Webster's also includes, "to propel
through the air in any manner" i.e. "heavy rifles . . . able to
throw a bullet five miles . . . " and "a fire engine throwing a
stream of water" and a "satellite will be thrown into space."
Interestingly, the dictionary contains over thirty-four (34)
definitions of the word "throw."
accepted, most are usual.
include:

All of these definitions are

Some of the more common meanings

"to cause to fall off" (the horse threw its rider); "to
6

drive or impel on a violent manner" (the ship was thrown on the
reef); "to put forcefully or roughly;" "to place or propel as if
by a throw;" "to deliver (a blow) in or as if boxing;" "to get
rid of: divest or strip oneself of: cast off;" "to send forth"
(throw a shadow).

Id.

There is nothing in the plain language of the statute nor in
the purpose of the statute that indicates that the legislature
was concerned about the forward motion of prisoners1 arms.
Certainly to focus on such would make the statute absurd.
Imagine, to use a baseball pitch like motion to throw fecal
material on a guard would be illegal but to throw backwards would
not, to kick fecal material would not, to use a device to throw
or fling fecal material would not.

More importantly, the harm to

be prevented has little if anything to do with the method with
which substances are propelled.

The health and safety of the

officers will be compromised just as much whether the foul
substances are the result of the forward motion of the hand and
arm or the result of some other method the prisoner used to
propel the substance.

Surely the legislature did not intend to

give the word "throw" a meaning that delineates whether

or not

activity is criminal, based upon criteria that has little if
anything to do with the harm sought to be prevented.
On the other hand the definition of "throw" that means "to
propel through the air in any manner" is reasonable and does give
effect to the legislative intent.

It is an accepted and usual

meaning of the word "throw" and allows the statute to delineate
7

whether the activity is criminal or not on criteria directly
related to the harm sought to be prevented.

Furthermore, with

such a definition, the statute is given full effect under most if
not all of the circumstances in which prisoners could use flying
foul substances to be "not kind to their innkeepers."
In other contexts and without excuse or codified
definitions, the legislature has used the word "throw" in ways
unrelated to the forward movement of the hand and arm.

Utah Code

Ann. § 41-6-150.10 (1992) requires mud guards on motor vehicle's
wheels that "may throw dirt . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-13-103
(1992) requires eye protection for students in activities
involving "the operation of equipment that could throw particles
. . . ." Also, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1992) prohibits
certain devices that are "arranged so as to explode, ignite, or
throw forth its contents . . . ."
The usual and accepted meaning of the word "throw" includes
to propel in any manner.

Such a definition also includes the

action of spitting mucous at and onto correctional officer Byrge.
After all, spitting is just a method of propelling mucous through
the air.

In this case, defendant spit the mucous from his

position it traveled through the air and hit the officer.
Moreover, the very definition of spitting includes "throw."
dictionary definitions include, "to eject from the mouth

The

..."

and "to emit or eject as if by spitting: throw forth or out . . .
." Webster1 New International Dictionary 2199 (1981).
Given the plain language of the statue and the legislative
8
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Id, at

e

1860.

Therefore, the Court held, the statute was void-for-

vagueness and encouraged arbitrary enforcement.

Id.

In State v. Archambeau, the defendant parolee was convicted
of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon By a Restricted Person.
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991).

The

court held that the defendant should have been reasonably aware
that the two 10-inch knives and 48 inch blowgun were "objectively
dangerous weapons."

Id. at 929. Although Archambeau received a

warning about possessing dangerous weapons, the court did not
treat this as dispositive.

Id. at 929, ("Furthermore, defendant

was specifically put on notice by his parole officers . . . " ) .
Thus the statute's use of the terms "dangerous weapons" was not
vague.

Archambeau, at 929.

In Pratt v. State, the defendant was convicted of 'Keeping a
Disorderly House,' and subsequently appealed.
642 P.2d 268, 269 (Okl.Cr. 1982).

Pratt v. State,

The defendant claimed the

terms "peace, comfort or decency," in the statute were subject to
multiple definitions and rendered the statute unconstitutionally
vague.

Id.

The court held that the terms were not vague because

all that was required was a reasonable certainty that the conduct
was prohibited by the general term without the aid of definition.
Id. at 270.

It does not even violate due process "though the

definition of the term contains an element of degree whereby
reasonable men may differ."

Id.

The neighbors of the defendant

in Pratt testified they were subjected to "loud and raucous
music, public drunkenness, urination in public, fist fights,
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effect
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the

legislature's

intent.

Second,

there

are

numerous other usual and accepted meanings in the dictionary that
do give

effect to the

intent of the

legislature.

Third, the

legislature has used these usual and accepted definitions in other
statutes.

Therefore,

the

court

should

apply

the

rules

of

construction to reasonably and fairly interpret the statute to give
effect to its design and purpose, that

is to define the word

"throw" to include "to propel through the air in any manner" and
also to define the act of spitting to be included in the definition
of "throw."
The
vague.

Assault

on

A

Corrections

statute

is

not

The statute establishes a standard by which the corrections

offers can measure a violation.
aware

Officer

that

conduct.

spitting

on

a

A prisoner should be reasonably

corrections

officer

is

prohibited

Finally, projecting mucus into the hair of a corrections

officer is not outside the objectives contemplated by the statute.
Therefore, the statute does not violate the due process clause of
either the Utah or the United States Constitution.
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Conclusions of Law and Order on the Nick Paul case. I did not
attach a copy of it with my brief when I filed it. However, ! am
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FINDINGS OF FACTO
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testify that on May 23, 1992, while Byrgt

was a prisoner confined in the Salt Lake County Jail and that
defendant intentionally spit a mouthfull of mucos at and on to
Byrge.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-102.6 which reads in

its entirety "Any prisoner who throws fecal material or any other
substance or object at a peace of correctional officer is guilty of
a Class A Misdemeanor," is not unconstitutionally vague because it
is sufficiently definite to enable ordinary people to understand
what conduct is prohibited
manner

that

does

not

and is otherwise written in such a

encourage

arbitrary

and

discriminatory

enforcement.
2.

The rules of statutory construction do not require

Section 7 6-5-102.6 to be limited to only fecal material but the
prohibition

on material thrown

includes any other

substance or

object.
3.

The word "throw" and used in Section 76-5-102.6 means

to propel through the air by the foward motion of the arm.

The

word "throw" does not include to spit or spitting.
DATED this

/6

day of August, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Tli^Honorable Dennis M Fuchs
Judge of The Third Circuit Court
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